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This paper implements natural language processing (NLP) models and neural networks to
predict mutual fund performance using the textual information disclosed in mutual fund
shareholder letters. Informed funds identified by the prediction model deliver superior ab-
normal returns and are more likely to receive an upgrade in Morningstar ratings. Informed
funds also attract greater flows in three days and up to 24 months after the disclosure of
shareholder letters, especially when their disclosure has greater investor attention, suggesting
that investors recognize the information from the qualitative disclosure. The machine learn-
ing model shows that informed funds tend to discuss sector specializations, portfolio risk
taking, big picture of the financial market, and mixed strategies across assets. Collectively,
this study shows that mutual fund disclosure contains rich, value-relevant textual informa-
tion that can be analyzed by state-of-the-art machine learning models and help investors
identify informed funds.
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1. Introduction
For investment companies (e.g., mutual funds), shareholder reports are more than a legal
requirement to disclose information such as portfolio holdings, fund performance, accounting
statements, and voting policies. It offers an effective channel to communicate with sharehold-
ers as well as potential investors on various topics, including dissection of wins and losses,
comments on sector and fund performance, emphasis of the investment philosophy, and in-
sights on the state of the economy and market. In his shareholder report on August 24, 2016,
the president of Impax Asset Management, Joseph Keefe’s concern on politics expanded such
an unconfined list of topics as he wrote at the beginning of his report: “To top things off,
we have Brexit . . . and a wave of . . . anti-immigration, anti-globalization sentiments suddenly
sweeping western countries, further clouding the economic horizon.” However, he remained
confident in his funds and added: “We strongly believe that over time our shareholders
benefit from investing in companies that meet higher environmental, social and governance
(ESG) standards. . . .We invest for the long term, so it is slow work, but it is vital work. It
may not make the headlines, but it is making a difference.”
While almost all quantitative information from shareholder reports originates from port-
folio holdings, which have been long studied by investors, analysts, and researchers, the
qualitative data from the rich textual discussions (i.e., shareholder letters1) remain under-
explored.2 Do managers share their insights and privileged information with the public in
shareholder letters? Can investors learn valuable information, such as managers’ investment
skill, from the disclosure in shareholder letters? Which funds benefit from such disclosures?
This paper tackles these questions.
There are several empirical challenges in extracting value-relevant information from mu-
tual fund shareholder letters. The first hurdle is to extract intrinsic syntactic and semantic
1In mutual fund shareholder reports, managers generally include shareholder letters to provide qualitative
discussions on various topics such as fund performance, sector performance, market overview, risk taking,
fiscal policy, politics, and global issues.
2For example, see “Qualitative Guidelines for Mutual Fund Selection,” John Deysher and Michael Walters,
June 2014, American Association of Individual Investors.
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features from the unstructured text. Traditional bag-of-words approach in textual analysis
relies on the meaning of individual vocabulary words and thus omits higher-order interactive
features among words and sentences, which can contain important qualitative information.
For example, the word “board” would have the same context-free representation in “welcome
on board” and “board of directors.” We overcome this challenge by implementing one of the
most cutting-edge developments in natural language processing (NLP) – Bidirectional En-
coder Representations from Transformers (BERT) created and developed by Devlin, Chang,
Lee, and Toutanova (2019). Unlike traditional language representation models that read a
context either from left to right or right to left, BERT jointly conditions on both left and
right contexts. Because BERT pre-trains deep bidirectional representations from a large
quantity of unlabeled texts, it can capture the higher-order semantic and syntactic structure
among words and sentences without losing information from a context.
The second obstacle arises from decoding relevant features from shareholder letters, i.e.,
determining what features are likely to be associated with the private information of fund
managers. We resolve this issue by building a recurrent neural network model to learn the
relation between linguistic features (extracted from fund managers’ shareholder letters via
BERT) and subsequent fund performance (computed as the alpha from the Fama and French
(1993) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model). To train and validate our model, we split the
sample of shareholder letters retrieved from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system into a training set and
a test set. We train the model using shareholder letters from 2006 to 2014 (i.e., the training
set) to fit it in financial contexts and then use the trained model to predict future fund
performance based on shareholder letters from 2015 to 2018 (i.e., the test set). We conduct
all empirical analyses in the test period to avoid using any information from the training
process.
We define a text-based fund informativeness measure, Textual Fund Information, based
on the predictions by the neural network model, and classify funds into informed and unin-
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formed funds. We show that informed funds identified from the information in shareholder
letters outperform uninformed funds by 0.9% every year. Even after controlling for various
fixed effects, fund characteristics, and skill measures that prior literature has shown to be
correlated with future fund performance,3 the economic and statistical significance of the
outperformance of informed funds is virtually unchanged. These findings suggest that Tex-
tual Fund Information is a time-varying measure and captures information that is largely
independent of observable fund characteristics and time-invariant unobservables at man-
ager, fund, and company levels. To account for the possibilities that managers may hide bad
information or have different writing styles, we control for the textual measures including
sentiment, readability and complexity, and the results remain intact.
Recent studies (Ben-David, Li, Rossi, and Song, 2019; Cheng, Lu, and Zhang, 2021;
Evans and Sun, 2021) document that mutual fund investors allocate their capital flows
based on Morningstar fund ratings. 7% of mutual funds in our sample explicitly discussed
Morningstar ratings in 2018. Given the impact of Morningstar ratings on funds and especially
on investors, we investigate whether Textual Fund Information is positively associated with
Morningstar ratings and the likelihood to receive an upgrade in ratings subsequently. We
find that not only do informed funds have higher future Morningstar ratings (i.e., level of
ratings), but they are also more likely to be rewarded higher ratings (i.e., change of ratings).
These findings further underscore the importance of Textual Fund Information for investors
on account of its predictive power on Morningstar ratings.
Given that the textual information in mutual fund disclosure predicts future fund per-
formance, a natural question is whether investors can identify informed funds from their dis-
closure and invest in such funds. Since shareholder letters are generally filed semi-annually,
we relate a fund’s Textual Fund Information to its capital flows over the six months after
investors receive shareholder letters. We show that informed funds receive 1.8% more capital
3The fixed effects include manager, fund, and company fixed effects. The skill measures include return
gap (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2008), DGTW benchmark-adjusted return (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers, 1997), and portfolio holdings return.
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inflows than uninformed funds over the six-month period. To the extent that fund skill will
be revealed in the long run, we further examine flows in the one year and two years after
investors receive shareholder letters to account for the possibility that uninformed funds ma-
nipulate the contents in shareholder letters to reduce the short-term redemption risk. We
find that informed funds attract 3% and 4.6% more flows than uninformed funds over one
year and two years, respectively. To reduce the concern that investors chase the most recent
performance, we control for contemporaneous performance when examining changes in flows
over longer horizons. The semi-annual disclosure frequency raises the possibility that concur-
rent new information from other sources, rather than the information in shareholder letters,
influences investors’ decisions. We thus employ daily flow data from Trimtabs database for
a subset of funds and confirm that investors put more capital into informed funds within
3-day and 5-day windows once they receive shareholder letters. For example, informed funds
attract about 25 bps more flows than uninformed funds within five days, equivalent to a
dollar value of $4.48 million for an average fund.
Since the target recipients of shareholder letters are investors, we consider how investors’
behavior affects fund managers’ expectations of disclosing information. Although it is im-
plausible to observe how each investor reads the letters and allocates her investment, we
use the number of visits to a shareholder letter on the SEC EDGAR website as a proxy for
the readership and investor attention on the letter. We show that informed funds attract
more flows in both the short term and long term when there exists a readership on their
shareholder letters. On the other hand, when such investor attention is nonexistent, there
is no difference in flows between informed and uninformed funds. This finding establishes a
direct link between Textual Fund Information and the subsequent investors’ actions.
We next endeavor to understand what contents are discussed by informed funds and
which funds are likely to include quality information in shareholder letters. Understanding
the first question helps us uncover the informational contents that contribute to the predictive
power of Textual Fund Information. We employ topic modeling to classify shareholder letters
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into four clusters via Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan
(2003). Based on the top five keywords for each cluster, we find informed funds tend to
discuss sector specialization, portfolio risk taking, the big picture of the financial market,
and strategies in mixed assets. Next, we show that our neural network model achieves greater
accuracy in identifying informed funds among those with a riskier portfolio. Informed funds
with a riskier portfolio generate superior performance, attract more capital flows, and have
a greater likelihood of receiving upgraded Morningstar ratings. In other words, these funds
tend to provide more quality information to investors because their actual skill is not easily
distinguishable from luck. Therefore, our model adds unique value on assessing hard-to-
evaluate opaque funds.
Given the topic-free nature of shareholder letters, some funds choose not to provide any
subjective discussion. Instead, they report quantitative information readily available from
other data sources such as performance in the last period or historical performance since
a fund’s inception. We do not include these shareholder reports in our sample because of
the lack of any qualitative information. However, it would be instructive to understand
which kind of funds are likely to provide active discussion. A determinant model built on
the decision of including a shareholder letter or not indicates that fund managers who take
higher risk, exhibit greater portfolio turnover, charge higher marketing expenses (12b-1 fees),
and seek for external labor market opportunities are more likely to utilize shareholder letters
as an effective tool to communicate with current and potential investors. These findings
suggest that funds that stand to benefit more from the additional qualitative disclosure in
shareholder letters (e.g., more transparency and publicity) choose to do so.
The contribution of this study is three-fold. First, this paper adds to the literature on
mutual fund skill and performance. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Amihud and Goyenko
(2013) identify skilled mutual funds based on measures constructed from historical fund
returns. Other studies on fund performance use fund holdings data. Brands, Brown, and
Gallagher (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008), and Cremers, Ferreira, Matos,
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and Starks (2016) show that active management and stock selectivity enhance fund perfor-
mance. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) show that stocks picked by mutual
funds outperform a characteristic-based benchmark. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) find that
funds that use less public information for selecting stocks exhibit better performance. Ferson
and Mo (2016) develop holdings-based performance measures to identify funds with secu-
rity selectivity. Our study departs from this literature by developing a new methodology to
measure fund private information and, to our knowledge, is the first study to create such a
measure based entirely on textual contents of mutual fund disclosures.
We also contribute to the burgeoning literature on the textual analysis by introducing
advanced machine learning techniques. The application of textual analytic techniques has
benefited research in finance, accounting, and economics (see survey articles, e.g., Loughran
and McDonald, 2016; Gentzkow, Kelly, and Taddy, 2019. The text representation from bag-
of-words models widely used in the literature (e.g., Hillert, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Ruenzi, 2016)
only captures context-free features of individual words and fails to account for the sentence,
the sequence of words, and relations among words. Other studies (e.g., Ke, Manela, and
Moreira, 2019; Garcia, Hu, and Rohrer, 2020) use machine learning algorithms to classify
the sentiment of news articles and conference call transcripts. We employ an advanced NLP
model to capture higher-order semantic and syntactic features from mutual fund managers’
qualitative discussion. In addition, we apply a deep neural network model to translate
these features into fund information and interpret informational contents on which informed
funds are likely to discuss in their shareholder letters. Our study suggests that machine
learning techniques can assist in studying unstructured data that contain rich information
and providing insights into finance research.
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on disclosure. Theoretical literature doc-
uments that managers’ equilibrium disclosure strategies depend on the nature of competition
and their information environment (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Admati and Pflei-
derer, 2000). Cao, Du, Yang, and Zhang (2021) find that it requires stock picking skill
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and intensive research on firm fundamentals to reap benefit from copycatting competitors’
disclosed holdings. Since the shareholder letters contain less straightforward information
than disclosed holdings and is more difficult and requires more efforts to copycat, our setting
attenuates the possibility that managers may hide information due to the concern about
their competitors. While the literature on corporate disclosure often finds that disclosing
information is associated with proprietary costs,4 our findings shed lights on the potential
benefits of disclosure in the mutual fund industry. We provide empirical evidence that fund
managers can send their private signal by voluntarily disclosing qualitative information to
investors and find that informed managers, especially those whose skill is difficult to capture
through their historical performance, can benefit from disclosures. Moreover, we comple-
ment the existing literature to show that disclosures are beneficial when target recipients of
disclosures are likely to materialize the information that they receive.
2. Applying NLP and Neural Networks on Shareholder Letters
We implement two major steps to convert shareholder letters into a textual skill measure,
Textual Fund Information, ready to use for our empirical analysis. The first step is to extract
features from shareholder letters, and the second one is to build a neural network model that
uses extracted features as input and generates a prediction of informativeness for each fund.
The informal format of the shareholder letters conveys rich information to investors
but creates a hurdle for researchers because of the unstructured nature. The traditional
bag-of-words approach in the textual analysis may omit useful information. For illustration
purposes, here is a hypothetical discussion: “The fund performance was not bad.” In this
example, the manager should have a positive or neutral tone on fund performance, but the
bag-of-words approach would consider the tone to be negative.
There are two dimensional features from textual information. Lexicalized features and
4See, for example, Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2014), Bernard (2016), Cao, Ma, Tucker, and Wan (2018), and
Li, Lin, and Zhang (2018).
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higher-order interaction features among words. The former captures each word’s meaning
and property while the latter captures the sequence of words and relations between words
(Chen and Manning, 2014). However, as Loughran and McDonald (2016) point out, the
bag-of-words approach may not work well in the above example because of its limitation on
analyzing the semantic and syntactic structure among words.
We overcome the limitation by applying one of the most path-breaking developments in
NLP – BERT. It is the first bidirectional and unsupervised language representation and is
a neural network-based technique for NLP. Traditional NLP models, such as word2vec and
GloVe, are context-free and produce a single word embedding representation for each word
in the vocabulary. Moreover, these models read a text sequence either from left to right or
right to left.
However, not only does BERT read the entire text bidirectionally, but it also catches all
surroundings of a word to provide a context-dependent representation for the word. BERT is
trained on entire Wikipedia with 2,500 million words and the Books Corpus with 800 million
words. We apply the pre-trained base BERT model on shareholder letters and extract the
aggregate representation of a sentence in the final hidden state, denoted as a vector C ∈ RH
where H is the hidden size and equals to 768 in the base BERT model. High-quality features
C later serve as the input for a neural network model designed to select informed mutual
funds (see Appendix B for details of BERT).
One limitation of BERT is the applicability on inputs longer than several hundred words
(Pappagari, Zelasko, Villalba, Carmiel, Dehak, 2019). The length of shareholder letters
spans from less than a hundred words to over 2,000 words, resulting in applying BERT on
the entire document to be computationally inapplicable. To accommodate the applicability
of BERT, for each shareholder letter, we first use BERT on every sentence and then create
an N × C matrix as the aggregate representation of a shareholder letter, where N is the
number of sentences in a letter.
In the second major step, we build a recurrent neural network model in Keras, an open-
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source library that provides a Python interface for artificial neural networks. Our model
contains four hidden layers with an additional Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) layer.
We split all shareholder letters from 2006 to 2018 into a training set (from 2006 to
2014) and a test set (from 2015 to 2018). For the training set, we compute the future fund
Alpha (see Section 3.2 for variable construction) after each shareholder letter is filed. Next,
each year, we sort letters into tercile based on Alpha and label them with 2 (top tercile), 1,
and 0 (bottom tercile). In other words, letters with the label of 2 represent outperforming
funds in a year, while letters with 0 consist of underperforming funds in the same year. We
train our model with features generated from BERT and labels created from Alpha using all
shareholder letters in the training set.
After the model is trained, we apply the model on shareholder letters in the test set and
generate a predicted label for each shareholder letter.5 For example, a fund’s shareholder
letter with a predicted label of 2 (0) indicates that the fund would rank in the top (bottom)
tercile in terms of future Alpha.
Shareholder letters can have two components, backward looking information and forward
looking . Our research design helps extract the forward looking component, which has unique
value to researchers and investors. In the training set, the neural network model only captures
forward looking component that is predictive of future performance and effectively omits the
backward looking component. When the predictability is carried over to the test set, Textual
Fund Information is, therefore, constructed only by the forward looking component.
5We first train shareholder letters from 2006 to 2014 and predict labels for letters in 2015. We then
expand the training set with letters in 2015 and predict labels for letters in 2016 with the updated training
set. We repeat this rolling procedure until the end of the sample.
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3. Data, Variable Construction, and Sample Overview
3.1. Mutual fund shareholder reports
We scrape mutual funds’ shareholder reports from N-CSR (certified annual shareholder
reports for management investment companies) and N-CSRS (certified semi-annual share-
holder reports for management investment companies) filings on the SEC EDGAR website
from 2006 to 2018. A registered investment company (e.g., a mutual fund company) must
electronically file Form N-CSR (We use N-CSR to represent both N-CSR and N-CSRS filings
thereafter) to the SEC within ten days of sending corresponding reports to shareholders.
In many cases, managers include shareholder letters covering managers’ qualitative dis-
cussions on various topics such as fund performance, sector performance, market overview,
risk taking, fiscal policy, politics, and global issues. Unlike other parts in Form N-CSR, these
letters do not follow any template and therefore serve as effective communications between
funds and their investors. However, there does not exist a clear-cut section for shareholder
letters. We, therefore, write a computer program in Python to locate the beginning and
the end of a letter by common phrases and complement with manual work if the computer
program fails to extract the letter.6
As discussed in Section 2, shareholder letters from 2015 to 2018 serve as the test set for
the neural network predictions and are used for our empirical analysis. Based on the labels
of shareholder letters generated by our neural network model, we consider that funds whose
shareholder letters receive a label of 2 as predicted informed funds and those with a label of
0 as predicted uninformed funds. Funds with labels of 2 or 0 serve as the primary sample in
our empirical analysis.7 Specifically, the key variable of interest in this study, Textual Fund
6We first manually read 100 filings and summarize a list of common phrases such as “Dear Shareholders”
and “Sincerely;” then we apply the computer program on all filings. For filings that the program fails to
locate a letter, we manually check whether they do not have a letter or they use other phrases for the
beginning and the end of the letter; for the latter, we expand our list of common phrases and reapply the
program. Finally, we manual check the precision of letter extractions.
7The difference between predicted informed and uninformed funds provide more direct and sharp com-
parison on the information contents of the shareholder letters. Nevertheless, we include funds predicted to
perform neutrally (with a label of 1) as robustness checks and results are qualitatively similar.
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Information is an indicator variable equal to one if a fund is predicted to be informed and
zero if it is predicted to be uninformed based on shareholder letters.
To obtain data on the readership of shareholder letters, we use SEC EDGAR’s associated
Log File Dataset which tracks the traffic of requests and downloads. Specifically, it comprises
all records of the requests of SEC filings on EDGAR system from January 2003 to June
2017. Each observation in the original dataset contains information on the visitor’s Internet
Protocol (IP) address, timestamp, and the identifier of the filing that the visitor downloads.
Because shareholder reports are a part of Form N-CSR, we use the number of downloads
on a Form N-CSR to proxy for the readership on the embedded shareholder letters. We
keep all non-duplicate requests, including those made by robots and algorithms since recent
studies (Cao, Du, Yang, and Zhang, 2021; Cao, Jiang, Yang, and Zhang, 2021) show that
the information acquisition by automated downloaders exerts significant effects on disclosing
firms and funds.
3.2. Mutual fund data
We obtain fund return data and fund characteristics such as expense ratio, turnover
ratio, total net assets (TNA), and fund age from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund database and fund portfolio holdings from
the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings (s12) database. We use the MFLINKS tables
provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to merge the CRSP Mutual Fund
database and the Thomson Reuters s12 database. In addition, for more in-depth analyses
on the timing of capital flows, we use daily flow data from Trimtabs database.
To merge the N-CSR shareholder reports and the mutual fund databases, we construct a
link between Series ID (fund identifier in N-CSR) and the WFICN (Wharton Financial Insti-
tution Code Number; the identifier for fund portfolios in MFLINKS). Beginning on February
6, 2006, all open-ended mutual funds are required by SEC to report series (fund portfolio)
and class (share class) identification information in their N-CSR filings. For each Series ID,
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mutual fund companies also report the underlying share class information, including Class
ID, Class Name, and Class Ticker. We use the Class Ticker to match with the ticker symbol
in the CRSP Mutual Fund database. When a share class is matched by a ticker symbol, we
consider the associated Series ID and WFICN as matched. Since Series ID and WFICN are
both fund portfolio level identifiers, we drop the cases in which one Series ID is matched to
multiple WFICNs. At the portfolio level, we are able to match N-CSR filings with CRSP
data for 2,910 domestic equity mutual funds.8
Although mutual funds start to file N-CSR in 2003, the series and class identification
information are not mandatory until 2006. Therefore, we use filings from January 2006 to
December 2018. Over the 13-year span, our initial sample consists of 17,717 N-CSR filings
with shareholder letters by domestic equity funds.
Since we are interested in managers’ skill in making investment decisions, we drop ETFs,
annuities, and index funds and focus on actively managed funds. In addition, we follow the
conventional selection criteria in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) to identify domestic
equity funds. We aggregate all share classes at the fund level. TNA is aggregate total net
assets ($mm) across all share classes one month before a filing date. Age is the number
of years since the fund’s oldest share class is launched. We use the natural logarithms of
TNA and Age in our empirical analyses. Return-based variables, turnover ratio (Turnover),
expense ratio (Expense), 12b-1 fees (12b1Fee), and management fees (MgmtFee) are the
TNA-weighted average across all fund share classes and scaled to percentage points. Tenure
is the number of years since a portfolio manager is hired; if there are multiple managers for
a fund, the longest tenure is used.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
In general, funds report shareholder reports semi-annually. We therefore use a 180-day
(or 6-month) window after the filing of a shareholder report to measure fund performance
8Note that N-CSR is filed at the company level and a company may use the same filing for several funds
within the fund family. In untabulated results, we find that the returns of funds under the same CIK are
highly correlated. We also find qualitatively similar results in untabulated analyses when we exclude filings
that contain reports for multiple funds in the same company.
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(Alpha), computed as the intercept from the regression of daily excess returns on the Fama-
French-Carhart four factors, annualized by multiplying with 253. We follow the conventional
approach in Sirri and Tufano (1998) to construct flow measures in various windows, includ-
ing 3-day, 5-day, 6-month, 12-month, and 24-month. MSRating is the fund rating assessed
by Morningstar9 and retrieved in six-month post filing. To control for past risk taking and
performance, we use the daily returns in the 180 days prior to the filing of a shareholder re-
port to construct the annualized PastRisk, defined as the standard deviation of daily returns
multiplied by the squared root of 253, and PastAlpha measures. We control PastFlow by
calculating flows over the 6-month prior to the filing. To control for concurrent information
from portfolio holdings disclosed in the same Form N-CSR, we create two measures, Hold-
ingReturn and DGTWReturn, defined as the raw return and DGTW benchmark-adjusted
return on a fund’s portfolio holdings in the six month (∼ 180 days) post filing. All potentially
unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1% extremes.
3.3. Textual measures of shareholder letters
The traditional textual analysis uses a bag-of-words approach to measure managers’
sentiment in the letter. LM_Negative (LM_Positive) is the number of Loughran-McDonald
(Loughran and McDonald, 2011) finance-related negative (positive) words in a shareholder
letter divided by the total number of words in the shareholder letter, expressed in percentage
points. To account for the readability and complexity of the writing, we use DocumentSize,
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of words in a shareholder letter to proxy for
readability (Loughran and McDonald, 2014), and TextDiversity, defined as the ratio of the
number of distinct words in a shareholder letter to the square root of the total number of
words to capture complexity (Carroll, 1964). We include these variables as textual control
variables.




4. Can Textual Fund Information Select Informed Funds?
4.1. Fund performance
One of the critical tasks is to confirm the joint hypothesis that mutual funds disclose
private information in shareholder letters so that our neural network model can be successful
in selecting informed funds. Therefore, we examine the future fund performance to validate
the predictions from our model.
In this study, we focus on domestic equity funds because they are the predominant class
of mutual funds, and their performance has well-defined benchmarks, such as the Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model. We consider the following regression at the filing level,
indexed by fund(i)-filing(j)-date(t), with year, fund, fund family, and manager fixed effects:
Alphai,j,t = βTextual Fund Information i,j,t + γFundChari,j,t+
αi + αfamily + αmanager + αyear + εi,j,t (1)
Under the hypothesis that the neural network model is competent in selecting informed
funds, we expect coefficient β to be significantly positive. Results in Table 2 confirm such a
conjecture. Informed funds identified by the prediction model beat uninformed funds across
all specifications. The first four columns show that the annual abnormal return of informed
funds is 80 to 88 bps higher. A comparison between the specifications with and without fund
fixed effects is revealing. Adding fund fixed effects virtually does not affect β, suggesting
that the informativeness of a fund is time varying and depends on the manager’s private
information for the next period. We further add manager fixed effects and find qualitatively
similar results, confirming that Textual Fund Information captures managers’ information
set in the subsequent period and is not driven by unobserved, time-invariant manager and
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company characteristics.10
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Because the training and predicting process only uses textual contents from shareholder
letters, Textual Fund Information should be independent of other characteristics or skill mea-
sures considered by the existing literature to be correlated with future fund performance.
Indeed, after controlling for fund characteristics such as past performance, size, and age, and
skill measures11, the economic and statistical significance of the outperformance of informed
funds is virtually unchanged. Because of its time-varying nature, Textual Fund Informa-
tion is distinct from skill measures documented in the extant literature. Managers also
disclose portfolio holdings, which may contain information about future performance, along
with shareholder letters in Form N-CSR, we further control for contemporaneous returns on
portfolio holdings, HoldingReturn and DGTWReturn, to capture information orthogonal to
portfolio holdings, and obtain similar coefficients on Textual Fund Information, suggesting
that Textual Fund Information provides incremental information to portfolio holdings, which
are presented in the same disclosure.
The effects are almost invariant with or without the textual control variables such as
LM_Negative, indicating that traditional bag-of-words measures in the textual analysis have
little confounding effect. These textual variables related to sentiment and tone also alleviate
the concern that managers may hide bad information. Managers may also have different
writing styles in the shareholder letters or use complicated language after poor performance,
we thus use DocumentSize and TextDiversity to proxy for readability and complexity of
writing, respectively, to rule out the possibility that writing styles affect the value-relevant
information in the disclosure. The results are unaltered after accounting for the complexity
10In untabulated analysis, we control for manager switches and find that managerial turnover does not
affect the predictive power of Textual Fund Information, suggesting that the personal writing style is unlikely
to be correlated with Textual Fund Information.
11In untabulated analysis, we control for ex ante skill measures, including return gap (Kacperczyk, Sialm,
and Zheng, 2008), DGTW benchmark-adjusted return (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997), R-
squared from the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013), and past portfolio
holdings return
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of language. Interestingly, managers who write longer letters with more concise language
tend to perform better.
4.2. Morningstar fund rating
Recent studies (Ben-David, Li, Rossi, and Song, 2019; Cheng, Lu, and Zhang, 2021;
Evans and Sun, 2021) document that investors use Morningstar fund ratings to allocate
their capital flows. It is, therefore, rational for funds to improve their ratings. For instance,
7% of shareholder letters in 2018 explicitly mentioned Morningstar ratings or benchmark
returns created by Morningstar.
We consider Morningstar rating as another proxy for skill and expect informed funds
predicted by the neural network model to have higher future Morningstar ratings and be
more likely to experience an upgrade in Morningstar ratings. Specifically, we consider the
following regression at the filing level, indexed by fund(i)-filing(j)-date(t), with year and
fund (or fund family) fixed effects:
MSRatingi,j,t = βTextualFundInformationi,j,t+γFundChari,j,t+αi(αfamily)+αyear +εi,j,t
(2)
Note that the coefficient β captures the relation between Textual Fund Information and
the level of MSRating. If we add PastMSRating as a control variable, then the coefficient β
captures the relation between Textual Fund Information and the change in MSRating.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Table 3 reports the results for both cases. For example, column (1) shows that informed
funds are likely to be associated with a 0.1 standard-deviation higher MSRating. In columns
(5) and (6), we find qualitatively similar results when controlling PastMSRating, suggesting
that not only are informed funds more likely to have a higher MSRating, but also have a
greater likelihood to receive an upgrade in MSRating.
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5. Can Investors recognize Textual Fund Information?
5.1. Fund flows
Since the predictions by the neural network model purely rely on textual information
contained in the shareholder letters which target fund investors, a natural question is that
whether letters written by informed funds attract more flows than those written by unin-
formed funds. A diagnostic test is thus to relate future fund flows to Textual Fund Infor-
mation in the cross section. Table 4 reports the results from the following regression at the
filing level, indexed by fund(i)-filing(j)-date(t), with year and style fixed effects:
Flowi,j,t = βTextual Fund Information i,j,t + γFundChari,j,t + αstyle + αyear + εi,j,t (3)
Although Flow6m is the primary variable that represents flows, we consider flows in the
long term and short term by using Flow12m, Flow24m, Flow3d, and Flow5d, measured in
various windows. For flows measured beyond the 6-month window, we also control contem-
poraneous Alpha to rule out the possibility that investors simply chase concurrent returns
instead of making investment based on information from shareholder letters.
The first two columns of Table 4 Panel A show that investors recognize Textual Fund
Information by putting more capital into informed funds than uninformed ones. The dif-
ference between flows into two groups of funds is 1.59% to 1.82% over a 6-month horizon
post filing. It is plausible that an uninformed fund manager can exaggerate his ability in
the shareholder letter to reduce the redemption risk. However, investors will observe his
true ability to collect private information in the long run, and we should not observe inflows
to his fund in the long term. The last four columns of Table 4 Panel A report that funds
predicted to perform better receive greater flows than those predicted to underperform be-
yond a semi-annual period and in up to two years after investors receive shareholder letters.
The economic magnitude of the difference in flows between two groups is 2.84% to 3.00%
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in the next year and 4.49% to 4.63% in the next two years. The results echo an incentive
for informed funds that they want to reduce capital constraint to achieve their long-term
investment strategy, even if they may not outperform in the short term.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
A presumable assumption for informed funds to attract flows is that investors pay atten-
tion to shareholder letters. Recent studies show that investment companies use Form N-CSR
and 13-F to make investment decisions (Chen, Cohen, Gurun, Lou, and Malloy, 2020; Crane,
Crotty, and Umar, 2020; Cao, Du, Yang, and Zhang, 2021). We zoom into the short window
around the dates on which funds send their letters to investors and analyze the timing of
flows. We posit that informed funds identified by the neural network model expect higher
flows right after shareholder letters are accessible to investors. To test this hypothesis, we
use daily flow data from the Trimtabs database that has been used previously in Greene and
Hodges (2002), Kaniel and Parham (2017), and Agarwal, Jiang, and Wen (2020).
Results in Table 4 Panel B confirm the conjecture. Informed funds attract 11.5 to 13.5
bps more capital flows during days [0, 3] and 23.4 to 24.5 bps more during days [0, 5] where
day 0 indexes the date on which funds file shareholder letters. We control style fixed effects
to minimize the possibility that investors may allocate their capital into funds differentially
because of various investment objectives. The results hold with year and style fixed effects.
The economic magnitude of the difference in flows within five days is equivalent to a dollar
value of $4.48 million for an average fund.
5.2. When are informed managers rewarded with greater capital flows?
One of the essential incentives for managers arises from the compensation scheme for
managing funds. Although managers can choose management fees at different levels, total
net assets (or capital flows) play an equally important role in determining their compensation.
If managers endeavor to write enlightening shareholder letters in order to signal their skill
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and attract capital flows, we should observe their success in doing so if fund investors indeed
read their letters and make investment decisions accordingly.
It is challenging to discover whether investors read shareholder letters since we cannot
track the identities of investors. To overcome the obstacle, we use the number of visits to
a shareholder letter on the SEC EDGAR website to measure the investor attention to the
letter, which proxies for the readership on the shareholder letter. We expect to observe more
responsive capital flows to shareholder letters by informed funds when there exists a greater
readership on their letters. On the other fund, flows are indifferent between informed funds
and uninformed funds if the investor attention to shareholder letters is lower. We reexamine
equation (3) for two subsamples that are partitioned based on the investor attention.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Results in Table 5 provide supportive evidence that informed managers are successful
in attracting more capital flows than uninformed managers when investors take their letters
into consideration in making investment decisions (i.e., investor attention is high). Such
results further validate that investors who invest in informed funds make decisions based on
the informational contents in shareholder letters rather than other concurrent sources.
6. Informational Contents of Shareholder Letters
6.1. Topics by informed funds
Section 4 confirms that the neural network model designed to select informed funds
achieves the goal and shows that selected funds produce higher future performance and are
more likely to have higher Morningstar ratings as well as receive an upgrade in the ratings.
Section 5 further finds investors recognize the skill derived from qualitative disclosure by
putting greater flows within 3-day window and in up to two years into informed funds. In
this section, we zoom into the model to understand the source of the predictive power.
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We first explore choices of topics discussed by informed funds. We exploit unsupervised
LDA, developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003), to classify shareholder letters into four
categories. For each category, we select the top five keywords to identify the potential topics
and assign a label based on these keywords.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Table 6 shows the list of topics discussed by informed funds. We observe that the first
group of funds tend to discuss sectors and are likely to be specialized in certain sectors such
as energy. The second category of funds focus on the risk taking of the portfolio and the
third group of funds incline to offer insights on the big picture of the financial market and the
economy. Although our sample consists of domestic equity funds, the conventional selection
criteria in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) do not rule out the possibility that funds
that invest primarily in the equity market can hold a small proportion of assets in bonds.
Interestingly, informed funds in the last category frequently discuss the bond yield, and the
interest rate, which depends on Fed policies. It is indicative that equity funds that hold
mixed financial securities are likely to perform well since these managers have the ability to
gather private information outside the equity market.
6.2. Who includes quality information in shareholder letters?
The underlying assumption for our neural network model to work well is that managers
provide informative discussions in shareholder reports. The results in Section 4 validate such
an assumption. However, given that disclosure is costly because competitors can copycat
the investment strategy of disclosing companies (Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven,
2004; Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau, 2014; Cao, Du, Yang, and Zhang, 2021), it begs
another question that to what extent disclosing quality information is optimal.
We explore what type of funds are capable of writing more informative textual contents.
We thus relate the accuracy of prediction to fund characteristics and consider the following
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Logit regressions:
AccuratePredictioni,j,t = γFundChari,j,t + αyear + εi,j,t (4)
Table 7 shows that our neural network model generates greater accuracy in funds en-
gaging in higher risk taking, measured as volatility of past fund returns. For funds with
higher risk taking, it is especially hard to distinguish their skill from luck because of volatile
historical returns. Therefore, our model adds unique value on evaluating these opaque funds
and can potentially provide insights to fund investors.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
The greater predictive power in high risk-taking funds can arise from a more detailed
and informative shareholder letter. To examine such a possibility, we conduct cross-sectional
analysis on high risk-taking funds and low risk-taking funds by replicating equations (1), (2)
and (3).
Table 8 Panel A shows that among “High Risk Funds,” informed funds outperform
uninformed funds by 1.32% to 1.40% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. The outperformance
is much weaker or insignificant among “Low Risk Funds.” Table 8 Panel B reports that
among funds with high risk-taking, informed ones are more likely to receive an upgrade
in Morningstar ratings compared with their uninformed counterparties. Such a result is
nonexistent among funds with low risk taking.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
In Table 8 Panel C, High Risk Funds are more likely to attract capital flows if they
are evaluated to possess the skill. The incremental inflows are significant regardless of the
horizons over which flows are measured (from 3-day to 24-month). On the other hand,
Low Risk Funds on average experience the same amount of flows, and there is no difference
between informed funds and uninformed funds.
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In sum, because our neural network model relies entirely on the textual contents in
shareholder letters, the results in Table 8 supports the view that informed managers that take
greater risk are more likely to write an informative letter to investors in order to distinguish
themselves from uninformed managers.
6.3. Voluntary disclosure and fund characteristics
To further understand the incentives for managers to disclose their privileged informa-
tion, we compare funds in our sample with funds that do not include a shareholder letter in
Form N-CSR12 and examine whether the decision to include a letter is related to any fund
characteristics. Because there are only two outcomes (i.e., to include or not to include a
letter), we consider a determinant model with Logit regressions:
ShareholderLetteri,j,t = γFundChari,j,t + αyear + εi,j,t (5)
Table 9 represents the relations between fund characteristics and the likelihood of in-
cluding a shareholder letter in Form N-CSR. Funds with higher risk taking are more likely
to not only write informative shareholder letters (Section 6.2 and Tables 7 and 8) but also
include qualitative disclosure in their filings in the first place. There is additional evidence
that funds with higher turnover rates tend to write shareholder letters since it is difficult for
investors to disentangle their true skill from frequent portfolio changes.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
The likelihood to include a shareholder letter is positively associated with 12b-1 fees,
indicating funds that spend remarkable expenses on marketing and distributions are likely
to utilize shareholder letters as an efficient tool to communicate with investors. Older funds
12Some funds choose not to provide any subjective discussion. Instead, they report quantitative information
readily available from other data sources such as performance in the last period or historical performance
since a fund’s inception. We consider these funds as funds that do not include a shareholder letter because
of the lack of any qualitative information.
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and funds with longer manager tenure are more likely to write shareholder letters because
managers may have less career concern and, therefore, greater likelihood to offer voluntary
discussions spanning various topics that intrigue potential investors, consistent with the
notion that disclosing valuable information that bears out in the future signals managerial
skill and can help the manager in the future labor market (Stern and James, 2016). Because
future labor market opportunities include both the external jobs and internal promotions, the
results also highlight the incentive to disclose true information since any falsified information
can be easily verified by the current employers and thus detrimental to plausible internal
promotions.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper creates an innovative mutual fund private information measure, Textual Fund
Information, by implementing NLP and neural network models on textual information con-
tained in mutual fund shareholder letters. The neural network model that we design to pre-
dict future fund performance is more competent than traditional bag-of-words approaches in
textual analysis. It is successful in identifying informed funds that deliver better abnormal
returns and receive higher Morningstar ratings. We open the black box machine learning
by compiling a list of topics discussed by informed funds, including sector specialization,
portfolio risk taking, big picture of the financial market, and mixed strategies across assets.
The informational contents on these topics contribute to the predictive power of Textual
Fund Information.
Furthermore, funds with Textual Fund Information attract greater capital flows in both
short-term and long-term than those without, suggesting investors are capable of recognizing
such skill; the results are more pronounced when more investors take letters into account in
making investment decisions.
Our model produces greater accuracy for funds with a riskier portfolio, which are gener-
ally viewed as opaque funds because their true skill is hard to distinguish from luck. More-
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over, these funds are more likely to write informative letters than funds that take a lower risk.
Funds with higher risk taking, higher portfolio turnover rates, greater marketing expenses,
longer manager tenure, and older funds are more likely to include qualitative disclosure in
Form N-CSR because they view shareholder letters as necessary tools to communicate with
investors.
Our applications of NLP models and neural networks capture higher-order syntactic
interactions among words and sentences and convey unstructured textual data into numerical
information that becomes accessible to researchers. Our study contributes to the growing
literature on applying machine learning in exploring finance-related questions that are under
debate or still lacking an answer. While we rely entirely on textual data to build our model,
it is worthwhile to expect that future research can complement textual data with traditional
numerical data to develop promising applications.
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Textual Fund
Information We use BERT to convert a fund’s textual shareholder letter to numericalparameters and then build a neural network model to predict a label on
the future performance of a fund. Each year, funds are predicted with
labels of 2, 1, and 0. Textual Fund Information is an indicator variable
equal to one if a fund has a label of 2 and zero if it has a label of 0.
Alpha The Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha using daily returns during
days [0, 180] for a fund’s filing on day 0, expressed in percentage points.
Flow6m
(Flow12m, Flow 24m) The future 6-month flow for the filing of fund i in month t, expressedin percentage points.
Flow6m = (TNAi,t+5 + TNAi,t−1 ×Ri,[t−1,t+5])/TNAi,t−1
Flow12m and Flow24m are calculated analogously.
Flow3d (Flow5d) The flow during days [0, 3] ([0, 5]) for a fund’s filing on day 0, expressed
in percentage points.
MSRating Fund rating calculated by Morningstar in month t + 5where t is the
filing month.
AccuratePrediction An indicator variable equal to one if a fund with Textual Fund Informa-
tion equal to one (zero) is in the ex-post top (bottom) tercile of Alpha,
and zero otherwise.
ShareholderLetter An indicator variable equal to one if a fund includes a qualitative share-
holder letter in N-CSR reports, and zero otherwise.
PastRisk The return volatility during days [-180, -1] for a fund’s filing on day 0.
PastAlpha The Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha using daily returns during
days [-180, -1] for a fund’s filing on day 0, expressed in percentage points.
PastFlow The past 6-month flow during months [t – 6, t – 1] for a fund’s filing in
month t.
Log(TNA) The natural logarithm of a fund’s TNA ($mm) in month t – 1.
Expense The most recent expense ratio prior to filing month t.
Turnover The most recent turnover ratio prior to filing month t.
Log(Age) The natural logarithm of a fund’s age.
LM_Negative The number of Loughran-McDonald (LM) finance-related negative
words in a shareholder letter divided by the length (i.e., total number
of words) of the letter, expressed in percentage points.
LM_Positive The number of LM finance-related positive words in a shareholder letter
divided by the length of the letter, expressed in percentage points.
DocumentSize The natural logarithm of the number of words in a shareholder letter.
TextDiversity Carroll (1964) corrected type-token ratio, defined as the ratio of the
number of distinct words in a shareholder letter to the square root of
the total number of words in the letter.
HoldingReturn The raw return on a fund’s portfolio holdings during months [t, t + 5]
for a fund’s filing in month t. .
DGTWReturn The DGTW benchmark-adjusted return on a fund’s portfolio holdings




PastMSRating Fund rating calculated by Morningstar in month t – 1 where t is the
filing month.
PastReturnGap The average return gap during months [t – 6, t – 1] for a fund’s filing in
month t. The calculation of the return gap follows Kacperczyk, Sialm,
and Zheng (2008).
Tenure The number of years since a portfolio manager is hired. If there are
multiple managers for a fund, the longest tenure is used.
12b1Fee The most recent 12b-1 fees prior to filing month t.
MgmtFee The most recent management fees prior to filing month t.
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Appendix B: Details of Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT)
Transformers are designed to handle tasks such as text summarization, which finds the
most informative sentences in a document, using sequential data. BERT build on Transform-
ers and learn contextual relations among words in a text. Unlike traditional NLP models
that input the text sequentially (from left to right or from right to left), BERT read entire
sequence of words at the same time and thus are able to learn the context of a word using
all its surroundings.
The embedding representation of a word (i.e., token), denoted by E, is input from the
embedding layer. Take the first token in Figure A1 as an example, E1 is the embedding
representation and T1 is the final output of the first token. Trm are the representations of
the same token in each intermediate layer. The base BERT model that we use in this paper
have 12 intermediate layers.
Figure A1: BERT architectures (source: reprinted from Devlin et al., 2019)
For each token, its input representation is the sum of the token embedding, the segment
embedding, and the position embedding. As Figure A2 shows, the embedding representation
of a word not only captures the meaning of the word, but also reads its sequence and relations
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with the surrounding context. Special tokens [CLS] and [SEP] are used to separate sentences.
Figure A2: BERT input representation (source: reprinted from Devlin et al., 2019)
When using BERT to read sentences, a user is required to add a special token [CLS] as
the first token of every sentence. This special token in the final hidden state is the aggregate
sequence representation, denoted as a vector C ∈ RH, where H is the hidden size and equals
to 768 in the base BERT model. The final hidden state therefore corresponds to C, T1, T2,
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics. Fund characteristics and filing level variables are based
on the sample of funds and their shareholder letters from 2015 to 2018. Variables are defined in
Appendix A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Mean Median Std P25 P75 N
Alpha -1.45 -1.14 8.38 -4.96 2.76 6,002
Flow6m -1.25 -4.74 31.96 -9.59 0.43 5,896
Flow12m -2.51 -9.74 46.09 -18.44 0.36 5,806
Flow24m -3.65 -20.36 70.77 -35.35 -0.75 4,144
Flow3d -0.10 -0.05 2.16 -0.18 0.04 2,899
Flow5d -0.15 -0.09 2.64 -0.28 0.06 2,899
MSRating 3.05 3.00 0.94 2.33 3.75 5,267
PastRisk 11.29 11.86 6.08 6.77 15.64 6,000
PastAlpha -1.49 -1.10 7.87 -4.96 2.72 6,000
PastFlow -0.03 -4.44 36.29 -9.21 0.91 5,952
Log(TNA) 5.86 5.89 1.98 4.54 7.22 6,000
Expense 1.02 1.00 0.40 0.78 1.23 5,839
Turnover 73.70 44.00 103.30 23.00 80.00 5,839
Log(Age) 2.94 3.07 0.74 2.80 3.32 6,000
PastMSRating 3.05 3.00 0.95 2.33 3.80 5,232
LM_Negative 2.06 1.92 0.91 1.48 2.68 6,002
LM_Positive 1.84 1.78 1.23 0.94 2.65 6,002
DocumentSize 5.60 5.65 0.79 5.11 6.19 6,002
TextDiversity 8.49 8.63 2.22 7.23 9.92 6,002
HoldingReturn 0.00 0.00 0.66 -0.27 0.29 3,312
DGTWReturn 0.82 1.06 1.59 -0.03 1.88 3,514
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Table 2: Future Performance and Textual Fund Information
This table reports the regressions of future abnormal returns on Textual Fund Information and fund
characteristics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on
standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Alpha
Textual Fund Information 0.848*** 0.851*** 0.864*** 0.785*** 0.881*** 1.008**
(3.91) (3.94) (3.66) (2.92) (2.79) (2.29)
PastRisk -0.275*** -0.274*** -0.256*** -0.252*** -0.278*** -0.226***
(-11.00) (-10.51) (-8.03) (-4.87) (-4.54) (-2.91)
PastAlpha -0.050** -0.055** -0.089*** -0.179*** -0.205*** -0.158***
(-2.31) (-2.52) (-4.01) (-7.57) (-7.43) (-4.19)
PastFlow -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003
(-0.17) (-0.26) (-1.07) (-0.38) (-0.80) (-0.61)
Log(TNA) -0.109* -0.109* -0.140 -4.749*** -5.080*** -3.327***
(-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.51) (-8.90) (-7.37) (-3.88)
Expense -1.710*** -1.721*** -1.598*** -6.483*** -5.173** -2.492
(-4.19) (-4.23) (-2.70) (-3.00) (-2.07) (-0.76)
Turnover -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.006
(-1.15) (-1.29) (-0.74) (0.63) (0.67) (-0.77)
Log(Age) 0.077 0.089 -0.171 6.227*** 5.947*** 3.522













Observations 5,803 5,803 5,766 5,505 5,156 2,703
R-squared 0.057 0.064 0.164 0.326 0.361 0.461
Manager FE No No No No Yes Yes
Fund FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Family FE No No Yes No No No
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: Future Morningstar Rating and Textual Fund Information
This table reports the regressions of future Morningstar rating on Textual Fund Information and
fund characteristics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics, in parentheses, are
based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable MorningstarRating
Textual Fund Information 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.104*** 0.038** 0.053*** 0.048***
(3.42) (3.52) (4.25) (2.25) (3.88) (3.26)
PastRisk 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.004** -0.003
(0.35) (0.41) (-1.02) (1.11) (-2.11) (-1.13)
PastAlpha 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(11.58) (11.55) (9.19) (5.93) (3.22) (3.27)
PastFlow 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.000* 0.001**
(2.99) (2.99) (2.34) (1.94) (1.86) (2.09)
Log(TNA) 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.186*** 0.021 0.019*** -0.066**
(11.17) (11.13) (10.32) (0.53) (2.95) (-2.06)
Expense -0.301*** -0.298*** 0.055 0.134 0.056 0.038
(-4.39) (-4.28) (0.50) (0.62) (1.55) (0.24)
Turnover -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.67) (-0.66) (-0.25) (0.99) (0.41) (1.53)
Log(Age) -0.063 -0.066 -0.152*** -0.166 -0.023 -0.016
(-1.50) (-1.55) (-2.84) (-0.55) (-1.00) (-0.06)
PastMSRating 0.795*** 0.449***
(71.38) (20.32)
Observations 5,112 5,112 5,077 4,876 5,032 4,832
R-squared 0.193 0.194 0.461 0.822 0.795 0.857
Fund FE No No No Yes No Yes
Family FE No No Yes No Yes No
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Future Flows and Textual Fund Information
This table reports the regressions of future monthly flows and daily flows on Textual Fund Informa-
tion and fund characteristics. Variables are defined in Appendix A.The t-statistics, in parentheses,
are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Monthly Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Flow6m Flow12m Flow24m
Textual Fund Information 1.587* 1.819** 2.844** 2.992** 4.489* 4.634**
(1.93) (2.23) (2.30) (2.41) (1.94) (2.01)
PastRisk 0.283*** 0.358*** 0.646*** 0.737*** 1.165*** 1.480***
(3.67) (2.95) (4.31) (3.46) (3.31) (3.44)
PastAlpha 0.285*** 0.330*** 0.489*** 0.562*** 0.919*** 1.024***
(4.81) (5.72) (4.98) (6.07) (4.96) (5.89)
PastFlow 0.051* 0.040 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.287*** 0.280***
(1.71) (1.18) (3.46) (3.07) (3.56) (3.48)
Log(TNA) -1.805*** -1.865*** -3.213*** -3.305*** -5.099*** -5.340***
(-5.07) (-5.30) (-5.72) (-5.81) (-4.55) (-4.69)
Expense -7.189*** -7.430*** -11.042*** -10.903*** -15.748*** -14.278***
(-4.92) (-4.99) (-4.70) (-4.59) (-3.48) (-3.16)
Turnover 0.016*** 0.014** 0.023** 0.021** 0.004 0.007
(2.74) (2.54) (2.55) (2.12) (0.32) (0.49)
Log(Age) -3.459*** -3.665*** -6.684*** -7.129*** -17.570*** -17.644***
(-3.40) (-3.61) (-3.90) (-4.02) (-5.66) (-5.65)
Alpha 0.756*** 0.751*** 1.167*** 1.165***
(9.31) (9.26) (6.24) (6.08)
Observations 5,687 5,664 5,624 5,601 4,063 4,047
R-squared 0.041 0.055 0.093 0.110 0.135 0.161
Style FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Daily Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Flow3d Flow5d
Textual Fund Information 0.115* 0.135** 0.245** 0.234***
(1.73) (2.12) (2.36) (2.64)
PastRisk -0.001 0.017 -0.000 0.016
(-0.11) (1.54) (-0.03) (1.37)
PastAlpha 0.019** 0.020** 0.021** 0.019**
(2.00) (2.30) (2.45) (2.41)
PastFlow 0.003* 0.002 0.001 0.001
(1.73) (1.53) (0.44) (0.26)
Log(TNA) -0.006 -0.004 -0.022 -0.016
(-0.31) (-0.18) (-0.93) (-0.62)
Expense 0.043 0.025 -0.054 -0.143
(0.38) (0.24) (-0.37) (-0.89)
Turnover -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.22) (-1.49) (-0.14) (-0.00)
Log(Age) -0.004*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005**
(-2.84) (-2.08) (-3.31) (-2.33)
Observations 2,789 2,784 2,789 2,784
R-squared 0.026 0.056 0.011 0.044
Style FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Future Flows and Investor Attention to Shareholder Letter
This table reports the regressions of future flows on Textual Fund Information and fund characteristics for subsamples partitioned
based on the investor attention, measured by the number of downloads of the fund’s shareholder letter on the SEC EDGAR website.
Funds are sorted into two groups by median. The group above (below) median is labeled as “High (Low) Investor Attention Funds.”
Variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subgroups High Investor Attention Funds Low Investor Attention Funds
Dependent Variable Flow6m Flow12m Flow3d Flow5d Flow6m Flow12m Flow3d Flow5d
Textual Fund Information 3.914** 5.380** 0.239* 0.376** 0.702 2.139 0.018 0.079
(2.04) (2.32) (1.73) (2.09) (0.59) (1.06) (0.22) (0.79)
PastRisk 0.447 0.886** 0.024 0.034 0.216 0.967** 0.014 0.023
(1.61) (2.46) (1.24) (1.35) (1.23) (2.27) (0.54) (0.92)
PastAlpha 0.427*** 0.816*** 0.012 0.003 0.239*** 0.612*** 0.031* 0.034**
(3.15) (4.83) (1.23) (0.19) (3.15) (3.34) (1.85) (2.21)
PastFlow -0.018 0.070 0.001 -0.003 0.093** 0.220*** 0.005* 0.006**
(-0.32) (1.00) (0.60) (-0.92) (2.44) (2.86) (1.72) (2.08)
Log(TNA) -3.630*** -5.423*** 0.016 -0.017 -0.481 -1.369 0.063 0.088
(-3.88) (-4.12) (0.27) (-0.25) (-1.12) (-1.59) (1.02) (1.57)
Expense -12.595*** -18.249*** 0.166 -0.252 -3.898*** -6.007* 0.346 0.238
(-3.35) (-3.64) (0.87) (-0.70) (-2.59) (-1.92) (0.98) (0.71)
Turnover 0.019 0.024 -0.002** 0.002 0.011 0.026 -0.006 -0.003
(1.56) (1.14) (-1.99) (0.91) (1.15) (1.40) (-1.07) (-0.51)
Log(Age) -5.066** -9.482*** -0.291*** -0.316** -3.695*** -7.706*** -0.121 -0.157*
(-2.49) (-3.33) (-2.64) (-2.21) (-2.88) (-3.23) (-1.31) (-1.84)
Alpha 0.861*** 0.773***
(5.96) (5.62)
Observations 1,704 1,689 873 873 1,769 1,756 879 879
R-squared 0.086 0.153 0.076 0.055 0.070 0.122 0.174 0.164
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Topics Discussed by Funds with Textual Fund Information
This table reports the top five keywords for each topic classified by LDA.
Category label Top keywords
Sector specialization sector information relative benchmark energy
Portfolio risk taking portfolio value believe asset risk
Bid picture of financial market financial global economy volatility policy
Strategies in mixed assets rate bond equity yield fed
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Table 7: The Accuracy of Predictions and Fund Characteristics
This table reports relations between the accuracy of predictions and fund characteristics using Logit
regressions. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics, in parentheses, are based on
standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable AccuratePrediction
PastRisk 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.034***
(3.63) (3.52) (3.38) (3.38)
PastAlpha -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.16) (-0.18) (-0.55) (-0.55)
PastFlow 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.22) (0.22) (1.15) (1.18)
Log(TNA) -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.046 -0.045
(-2.83) (-2.84) (-1.46) (-1.43)
Expense 0.187** 0.184** 0.172 0.177
(2.08) (2.03) (1.24) (1.26)
Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.32) (0.31) (0.40) (0.29)
Log(Age) 0.047 0.047 0.004 0.004















Observations 5,803 5,803 2,880 2,880
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.012
46
Table 8: Future Performance, Flows, Morningstar Ratings and Textual Fund Information:
Funds Risk Taking
This table reports the regressions of future abnormal returns, flows, and Morningstar ratings on
Textual Fund Information and fund characteristics for subsamples partitioned by the past risk
taking of funds. Funds are sorted into two groups by median based on PastRisk. The group above
the median is labeled as “High Risk Funds” and the group below the median is labeled as “Low
Risk Funds.” Variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on
standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Future performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subgroups High Risk Funds Low Risk Funds
Dependent Variable Alpha
Textual Fund Information 1.400*** 1.324*** 0.397* 0.039
(4.09) (2.89) (1.75) (0.14)
PastRisk -0.297*** -0.177* -0.225*** 0.148
(-3.87) (-1.89) (-5.78) (1.28)
PastAlpha -0.038 -0.241*** -0.128*** -0.305***
(-1.47) (-7.96) (-4.32) (-9.23)
PastFlow -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.007
(-0.62) (-0.01) (0.17) (-1.34)
Log(TNA) -0.267** -5.462*** 0.019 -3.171***
(-2.27) (-7.41) (0.26) (-4.90)
Expense -2.630*** -7.489** -1.048** -2.418
(-4.17) (-2.32) (-2.52) (-1.09)
Turnover -0.001 0.004 -0.002** 0.002
(-0.53) (0.52) (-2.43) (0.84)
Log(Age) 0.187 5.750*** 0.214 4.013
(0.73) (2.69) (1.08) (1.54)
Observations 2,831 2,457 2,905 2,428
R-squared 0.036 0.389 0.076 0.422
Fund FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Future Morningstar ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subgroups High Risk Funds Low Risk Funds
Dependent Variable MorningstarRating
Textual Fund Information 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.021 -0.001
(3.76) (3.13) (1.30) (-0.03)
PastRisk -0.006* -0.003 0.003 -0.010
(-1.77) (-0.63) (0.94) (-1.12)
PastAlpha 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.001
(3.68) (2.46) (2.62) (0.50)
PastFlow 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(1.10) (1.36) (2.33) (1.41)
Log(TNA) 0.010 -0.058 0.006 -0.026
(1.33) (-1.25) (1.04) (-0.54)
Expense -0.047 -0.014 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.42) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.01)
Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.13) (0.17) (0.25) (1.41)
Log(Age) -0.010 -0.054 0.041** 0.407
(-0.40) (-0.13) (2.04) (0.78)
PastMSRating 0.832*** 0.420*** 0.868*** 0.396***
(67.66) (13.01) (85.29) (10.45)
Observations 2,443 2,144 2,624 2,205
R-squared 0.749 0.860 0.792 0.884
Fund FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel C: Future flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subgroups High Risk Funds Low Risk Funds
Dependent Variable Flow6m Flow12m Flow3d Flow5d Flow6m Flow12m Flow3d Flow5d
Textual Fund Information 2.306* 4.291** 0.188** 0.315** 1.144 1.674 0.013 0.038
(1.75) (2.30) (2.07) (2.56) (1.29) (1.09) (0.21) (0.52)
PastRisk 0.174 0.801* 0.055 0.047 0.946*** 1.611*** -0.021 -0.001
(0.70) (1.93) (1.57) (1.52) (3.11) (2.94) (-1.15) (-0.06)
PastAlpha 0.325*** 0.585*** 0.023* 0.023** 0.361*** 0.710*** 0.013*** 0.011*
(4.44) (4.92) (1.94) (2.23) (4.31) (4.34) (3.17) (1.68)
PastFlow 0.031 0.159** 0.003 -0.000 0.045* 0.131*** 0.001 0.002
(0.58) (2.26) (1.20) (-0.08) (1.78) (3.10) (1.63) (1.56)
Log(TNA) -2.631*** -4.307*** 0.004 0.004 -1.114*** -2.500*** 0.008 0.011
(-4.27) (-4.49) (0.13) (0.12) (-2.79) (-3.71) (0.46) (0.45)
Expense -10.265*** -16.332*** 0.066 -0.001 -5.311*** -6.535** 0.025 -0.125
(-4.49) (-4.71) (0.48) (-0.00) (-2.72) (-2.00) (0.21) (-0.90)
Turnover 0.030*** 0.036** -0.004* -0.001 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.001
(2.96) (2.11) (-1.67) (-0.22) (0.04) (0.83) (0.05) (1.42)
Log(Age) -3.337** -6.866*** -0.157** -0.255*** -3.522*** -6.231** -0.063 -0.088
(-2.44) (-3.11) (-2.56) (-2.73) (-2.69) (-2.41) (-1.11) (-1.48)
Alpha 0.751*** 0.783***
(7.88) (5.27)
Observations 2,796 2,766 1,850 1,850 2,865 2,832 930 930
R-squared 0.066 0.124 0.066 0.051 0.066 0.113 0.082 0.071
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: Determinants of Writing Shareholder Letters
This table reports determinants of a fund’s decision to disclose a voluntary shareholder letter
with qualitative disclosure using Logit regressions. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The
z-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ShareholderLetter
PastRisk 0.009 0.013 0.014* 0.020**
(1.38) (1.57) (1.81) (2.03)
PastAlpha -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.18) (-1.22) (-0.14) (-0.09)
PastFlow -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.20) (-0.22) (0.52) (0.46)
Log(TNA) 0.012 0.013 -0.021 -0.021
(0.44) (0.48) (-0.63) (-0.63)
Expense -0.114 -0.115 -0.293 -0.308
(-0.79) (-0.80) (-1.26) (-1.31)
Turnover 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(1.86) (1.89) (1.89) (1.91)
Log(Age) 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.194** 0.191**
(4.04) (4.03) (2.55) (2.52)
PastReturnGap -0.028 -0.027 -0.037 -0.035







Observations 24,048 24,048 17,755 17,755
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015
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